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Abstract— The paper presents an initial comparison of a 
transmission planning study of cascading outages with a 
statistical analysis of historical outages. The planning study
identifies the most vulnerable places in the Idaho system and
outages that lead to cascading and interruption of load. This
analysis is based on a number of case scenarios (short-term and
long-term) that cover different seasonal and operating conditions.
The historical analysis processes Idaho outage data and estimates
statistics, using the number of transmission line outages as a 
measure of the extent of cascading. An initial number of lines
outaged can lead to a cascading propagation of further outages.
How much line outages propagate is estimated from Idaho Power
outage data. Also, the paper discusses some similarities in the
results and highlights the different assumptions of the two
approaches to cascading failure analysis.
Keywords—cascading; GATORS; outage data; planning; 
transmission equipment 
INTRODUCTION
The impact of cascading outages and blackouts on the
economy and society is extremely high. The power grid
around the globe today experiences an increased number of
cascading outages due to factors such as stress due to
increased transfers and unpredictable fluctuations due to
increased integration of variable energy sources.
Typical planning and seasonal operating studies, performed
by Western Electricity Coordinating Council (WECC) member
utilities, use base cases that model the entire Western
Interconnection. Idaho Power, since the major blackout event
on July 2nd, 1996 that originated in its service territory,
continuously evaluates and study its system to ensure that its
performance meets not only North Electric Reliability
Corporation (NERC) standards and WECC Reliability Criteria
[l]-[2] but also going beyond those requirements [3]-[5].
Idaho Power system is a portion of the Bulk Electric System
(BES) in the Western Interconnection.
Understanding cascading outages and being able to predict
the associated risks is becoming an integral part of planning
and operation studies by Idaho Power [5], In order to achieve
the secure operation ofthe system under not just traditional n-
1 and credible n-2 contingencies but also under other type of
n-k contingencies with high risks, Idaho Power has developed
a comprehensive risk-based methodology [3].
Historical assessment of outage data was used for realistic
identification of outages that likely lead to cascading in the
past [6]-[ll].
Both predictive and historical evaluations of cascading
outages are essential complementary approaches for assessing
the impacts and risks of cascading outages on system
reliability. However, there has been relatively little attention
given to linking these two approaches.
Historically, there have been a number of blackouts
worldwide that show the vulnerability of the power grid to a 
cascading sequence of events. Considerable efforts have been
put into research and development to identify the causes of
these outages and methods to mitigate them [12]-[15].
This paper investigates the outages that lead to cascading in
Idaho system by comparing predictive results and results
obtained from historical outage data. The approach takes into
consideration outages that lead to cascading and those that
result in load curtailment. Evaluation of historical outages is
based on the Generation and Transmission Outage Reliability
System (GATORS) outage database that was started at IPC in
1991 [16]. We also discuss some similarities in the results and
highlight the different assumptions of the two approaches to
cascading failure analysis.
TRANSMISSION PLANNING STUDY OF CASCADING
A. Idaho Power System 
Idaho Power Company service territory covers an area of
24,000 square miles serving over 520,000 customers. The
structure of the load is a combination of residential,
commercial, and industrial customers coupled with a large
component of irrigation and air-conditioning loads during the
summer. The system is summer peaking, with the all time peak
of 3407 MW attained on July 2nd, 2013. The source of most of
IPC's generation is hydroelectric (17 plants), but the company
also shares ownership of three coal fired plants. The total
installed generating capacity is over 3500 MW with an electric
power delivery system containing more than 5,800 miles of
transmission and 18,000 miles of distribution lines. The bulk
power system of Idaho is shown in Fig. 1 
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B. Generation and Transmission Outage Reporting System
(GATORS)
Idaho Power's GATORS collects outage data and monitors
the performance of all generation sources and transmission
facilities with an operating voltage of 46 kV and above [16].
In this paper, all transmission lines are categorized and
studied by voltage class. The emphasis is placed on the
analysis of sustained automatic outages of transmission lines.
The cause codes for sustained outages that are incorporated
into GATORS are listed in [16]. Each cause-code category has
been expanded with associated sub-categories. For instance,
the weather category has the following subcategories: adverse,
clear/calm, extreme cold, fog, hail, heavy rain, heavy snow,
high winds, ice, light winds, lightning in area, major storm
disaster, microburst, normal, overcast, rain, snow, and storm.
C. Approach to cascading 
1) Aims of Study 
Historically, the Idaho system is designed to perform
reliable service without interruption for all n-1 and credible n-
2 contingencies. However, widespread interruption and
cascading remain possible, especially if these contingencies
are accompanied by other system vulnerabilities that can result
in complex contingencies. Identification and analysis of
complex contingencies in Idaho Power system became
important issues that have been investigated in recent work in
both planning and operation environments [3]-[5], Reference
[4] presents a risk-based approach for contingency analysis
implemented at Idaho Power Company. The practical
approach to identify and analyze the effects of
complex/extreme contingencies is presented in [5], The
identification and mitigation of system risks and
vulnerabilities as results of extreme contingencies, that are
critical to ensuring the reliable operation of the bulk electric
system (BES), is presented in [5], It is very important to
identify contingencies that lead to voltage instability,
widespread power disruptions and the vulnerability of the
power grid to cascading. The aim of this planning study is to
perform a comprehensive evaluation of five base cases by
applying a great number of n-2 initiating events and to identify
those events that potentially can lead to cascading
2) Assumptions 
In this paper a "Cluster" based approach is utilized to
perform analysis of cascading outages [12]. It can be used to
quickly identify not just possible initiating events that may
lead to cascading outages but also to automatically determine
possible cascading chains. A power system network is
represented as a number of groups (clusters) that are connected
to the network with "critical" lines (cutsets) [12]. In a cluster
approach, the system is represented via three types of clusters:
load clusters, generation clusters, and connecting clusters.
If one of the "critical" lines (e.g., initiating events) within
the cluster or connecting two clusters is outaged, it may cause
large overloads on other line(s). If an overloaded line(s) is
switched off as a system protection measure, this may lead to
cascading. Those clusters that experience large flows on the
cutset are of a particular interest in this analysis.
3) Tool used 
The cluster-based methodology presented in [12] has been
extended and implemented in the Potential Cascading Modes
(PCM) tool [17]. The PCM tool was used extensively at Idaho
Power Company in the past and also to perform study for this
paper. Basic input data to PCM tool are: base case, list of
initiating events, monitored constraints (thermal, voltage),
tripping thresholds (line, transformer, load, and generator).
The most frequent scenarios of cascading outages are that
branches are overloaded above a certain limit, and protection
schemes initiate tripping of overloaded branches. Also, outage
can cause a deficit in reactive margin, so a considerable
reduction of voltages might be present that could further cause
motors to stop. Output results from the planning study can be
grouped as: list of initiating events that lead to cascading, list
of initiating events that propagate over several generations, the
impact of cascading outages measured by load interrupted, and
geographical locations of cascading events.
The list of initiating events that may lead to cascading is
identified by applying "smart" logic. The same logic is used to
predict development of cascading chains. Analysis of the
cascading outages is an important aspect of the planning
compliance studies where utilities are required to meet
requirements of the new NERC standard TPL-001-4 [1]. In
this approach all overloaded branches are identified and those
that are overloaded above the tripping threshold are
automatically tripped to simulate operation of protection
schemes. Thus, tiers or generations in the cascading chain are
identified.
Following an initiating event, branches are consecutively
tripped until one of the following events occurs: system fails to
solve due to voltage instability, loss of load exceeds a user-
specified threshold value, islanding with imbalance of load
and/or generation within an island, and a thermal and voltage
violation is alleviated or drops below the threshold limits.
Our study focuses on the evaluation of initiating events that
potentially could lead to stability violation, large loss of load,
and to cascading.
4) Results 
The planning study to identify initiating events that lead to
cascading was performed on five base cases that represent
BES ofthe WI (12hs, 131w, 13hw, 14hw, and 141w). A list of
N-1 breaker-to-breaker contingencies (around 200) for each
base case was combined into N-2 contingencies.
TABLEI
A SUMMARY O F PLANNING STUDY CASCADING RESULTS
Case
#of
initiating
events
#of stability
violations
#of events leading
to cascading
chains
#of events
leading to
cascading
12hs 26565 0 150 6
13lw 22155 1 22 10
13hw 23005 6 16 5
14lw 20503 4 16 6
14hw 20910 2 7 5
Over 100,000 initiating events were created in five studied
cases. Each case was processed for a corresponding list of
initiating events. A total of summary of results for each case,
that includes voltage stability in an initial case, outages that
lead to cascading generations, to cascading is presented in
Table I. All five cases except one experience voltage stability
under one or more contingencies. In all five cases 32 initiating
events (< 0.03% of all initiating events) progress to cascading
over four or less generations. In order to compare planning
study results with the statistical approach, the list of events
that lead to cascading is further reduced to 26 by eliminating
those that include the combination of two transformer outages.
In addition planning study includes eight initiating events that
combine new facilities that have been in operation for about 
four years and therefore there were limited historical outage
data statistics observed. Based on the above observations to
compare the results obtained by planning and statistical
approaches we use the total of 18 initiating events even though
9 of those combine a line and transformer. These 18 initiating
events progress to cascading over 4 generations (1), 3 
generations (3), 2 generations (3) and 1 generation (11).
ANALYSIS OF HISTORICAL OUTAGE D A T A
D. Historical outage data 
The historical data analysis begins with 8084 transmission
line outages recorded by Idaho Power Company in GATORS
over the 24 years from January 1991 to December 2014. Each
transmission line outage includes the outage start time (to the
nearest minute), the names ofthe buses at the ends ofthe line,
and the initial cause. The substation outages in the data are not
considered.
The first step is to clean and filter the data. Bus names and
line descriptions are standardized, and 7 rare outages of 6 lines
isolated from the main network are removed. Outages
involving lines joining more than 2 buses are simplified and
approximated by an outage of a line joining two buses, usually
by ignoring tapped line segments.
The line outages can be classified as planned or automatic
according to their initial causes. (Planned outage causes are
general maintenance, ground switch, maintenance, new
construction, removal, replace transformer, safety precaution,
sectionalizing-switching, and automatic outage causes are all
other causes, including unknown.) There are 3875 automatic
outages in the dataset, and these are the outages used for the
cascading analysis.
While historical data processing has many advantages,
including no modeling assumptions and a very favorable
grounding in reality, it should be kept in mind that the power
grid changes over 24 years, and that statistical analysis of
historical cascades necessarily describes cascading risk
averaged over the time period of observation.
E. Grouping outages into cascades and generations 
Cascading starts with initial outages (generation 0) and
then continues with further outages propagating in successive
generations until the cascade stops. We process the line
outages by grouping the line outages into individual cascades,
and then within each cascade grouping the outages that occur
in close succession into generations. The grouping is done
based on the outage start times according to the method of [8].
In particular, we look at the gaps in start time between
successive outages. If successive outages have a gap of one
hour or more, then the outage after the gap starts a new
cascade (note that operator actions are usually completed
within one hour). Within each cascade, if successive outages
have a gap of more than one minute, then the outage after the
gap starts a new generation of the cascade (note that fast
transients and protection actions such as auto-reclosing are
completed within one minute). For example, one ofthe longer
cascades in the data set is shown in Table II (bus names and
times are altered to preserve confidentiality).
TABLE II
EXAMPLE: GENERATIONS OF OUTAGES IN ONE CASCADE
TRANSMISSION LINE OUTAGE START TIME GENERATION
HOUR
BYRD-ISAAC
LASSUS-BYRD
ANON-LASSUS
DUFAY-IOSQUIN
LASSUS-DUFAY
ANON-DUFAY
DUFAY-IOSQUIN
LASSUS-DUFAY
MINUTE
01
01
13
14
14
14
22
04
This procedure applied to the 3875 automatic outages yields
2983 cascades. Most ofthe cascades are short: 91% ofthe
cascades have only the first generation of outages and do not
spread beyond these initial outages. It is important for a fair
statistical analysis to include the short cascades (even if they
are for other purposes not thought of as cascades); the short
cascades usually represent a successful case of resilience in
which no load is shed. That is, excluding the short cascades
would misleadingly bias the results towards the undesirable
and damaging cascades that do not stop quickly.
F. Initial outages and total outages after cascading 
The grouping of outages in each cascade into generations
allows the initial outages (generation 0) to be distinguished
from the subsequently cascading outages in generations
1,2,3,... This is of interest because the mechanisms and
mitigations of the initial line outages differ to a significant
extent from the interactions between line outages that are
involved in the subsequent cascade. Most ofthe initial outages
are single outages, but there are also multiple initial outages.
In other words, there are single, double, triple, etc
contingencies. The probability distribution of the number of
initial outages is shown by the black dots in Fig. 2. The
distribution of the initial outages is one way of looking at the
severity of initial events: 9% of the initial events have 2 
outages and 2.7% ofthe initial events have 3 outages. Under 3%
have 3 or more outages.
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Fig 2. Probability distribution of the number of initial outages and the
total number of outages after cascading. Note the log-log scales.
We can also look at the total number of outages after both
the initial outages and the subsequent cascading. The
probability distribution ofthe total number of outages after the
cascading is shown by the red squares in Fig. 2.
The difference between the initial outages and the total
number of outages shows the additional effect ofthe cascading
after the initial outages. There are more outages after
cascading, although the largest cascades are infrequent and so
their probability estimates shown in Fig. 2 are highly variable.
The difference due to cascading can also be seen in a different
presentation of the same data in Fig. 3. The cascading has a 
modest effect in increasing the probability of more than 1 or 2 
outages, but an order of magnitude increase in the probability
of more than 4 outages. That is, the data supports the
unsurprising but important result that cascading is most
important for large blackouts. For smaller number of outages
(less than or equal to 3), the effect of the cascading is modest.
This seems to support the use in the planning analysis of an
initial outage followed (typically) by one further generation of
contingencies. That is the planning analysis captures much of
the cascading for short cascades.
0.100
σ> 0.010
0.001
itr*
initial outages
total after cascading
*»u
1 202 5 10
number of line outages
Fig 3. Probability of more than k outages against k for the initial outages
and for the total outages after cascading
The effect of the further cascading becomes much more
important for 4 or more outages, in which the probabilities of
occurrence are small, but the cascading can make an order of
magnitude increase in the probability of that number of
outages. This leaves it open to other methods for estimating
and controlling the risk of large blackouts, such as monitoring
and limiting both initial outages (which is already done) and
propagation (which is new).
The distinction we can now make in the outage data
between initiating outages and subsequently cascading outages
allows us to find out and compare which lines are most
involved in these two different processes. The top 10 lines
involved in initiating outages overlap with but do not coincide
with the top 10 lines involved in subsequent cascading; there
are 6 lines in common but there are 4 lines in each list that
differ.
G. Quantifying cascade propagation 
The total number of outages in each generation of all the
cascades is shown in Table III.
TABLE III
Outages in Cascade Generations
Generation 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Outage Count 6715 896 189 47 16 5 4 1 1 
The generations of outages in the cascades are analogous to
human generations; parents in one generation give rise to
children in the next generation. The average propagation per
parent λ is the total number of children outages in all the
generations divided by the total number of parent outages in
all the generations, λ calculated from data is 0.12. That is, each
outage in a generation will, on average, be followed by 0.12
outages in the next generation, λ has the effect of controlling
how much the cascading will increase the number of outages
starting from the initial outages. The average propagation can
depend on the types of outages considered. Weather related
outages have increased propagation from 0.10 (normal weather
conditions) to 0.23 (adverse weather conditions). Outages in
the peak hours between 3 pm and 8 pm have increased
propagation from 0.10 (not peak hours) to 0.19 (peak hours).
However, outages in the summer months of June, July, August,
September have nearly the same propagation of 0.11 as all
outages. Since the cascades depend also on the initial outages,
it is still possible to have more cascading in the summer with
the same propagation. Indeed the data in the summer months
shows 27% more cascades per month and 32% more initial
outages per month. Idaho Power system is heavily stressed in
the summer particularly in months of July and August and
therefore probability of cascading under these conditions is
higher than during other seasons (both major blackouts in
1996 involved Idaho system happened in July and August).
The average propagation λ at each generation k can be
defined as the number of outages in generation k+1 divided by
the number of outages in generation k. The data has λο = 0.10,
λΐ = 0.21, λ2 = 0.34, λ3 = 0.48, and average propagation for
generation 4 or more λ4+ = 0.50. The average propagation
increases with k as the cascade propagates through its
generations; that is, the grid resilience is progressively
weakened by the preceding generations of outages.
Given the distribution of initial outages shown in Fig. 2,
the propagations λο, λΐ , λ2, λ3, λ4+ can be used in a branching
process model to predict the distribution ofthe total number of
outages using the method of [8]. The match with the observed
data is shown in Fig. 4.
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Fig 4. Probability distributions of the total number of outages after
cascading; dots are the binned data and the lines join the branching process
predictions.
The usefulness of this result is that the distribution of the
total number of outages propagation can be estimated via the
propagations with much less data (about one year) [8].
H. Cascade spreading 
The method of [10] is used to construct a network directly
from the outage data as shown in Fig. 5 (the network is
constructed simply by joining two buses with a transmission
line if the data includes an automatic or planned outage of the
line joining those buses.) The advantage of forming the
network in this way is that the outages can easily be located on
the network. Then statistics of how the cascades spread in the
network can be obtained. One limitation to be addressed in
future work is that the formed network currently corresponds
to the union of the actual grid lines as they change over the
time period of observation.
One way to measure the network distance between two line
outages counts the minimum number of buses in a path in the
network joining the two lines. For example, two lines with a 
common bus are a distance one apart.
Λ
.14
Fig 5. Network formed from line outage data. Layout is not geographic
We extend this definition [10] to the average distance
between generations of line outages to obtain the spreading
statistics of Figs. 6 and 7. One useful application for the
propagation and spreading results in this section is the
validation of models of cascading by comparing the match
between the simulated and observed results [7], [18].
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Fig 6. Probability distribution ofthe network distance between successive
generations of line outages
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COMPARISON
This section compares the two quite different approaches
to assessing system cascading performance described in the
previous sections. The planning predictive approach evaluates
with simulation carefully chosen stressed cases and identifies
initiating events that progress through several tiers
(generations) and lead to cascading. The historical approach
extracts statistics describing the observed cascades of
transmission line outages over a period of time. The two
methods are compared by applying them to the Idaho system
looking for consistent and understandable results, initial events,
propagation, cascading and impacts.
The planning study is based on a limited number of base
cases and a defined set of likely initial events and thresholds
for tripping load and/or generation during the cascading
process. This approach is useful for analyzing potential risks
for cascading under a defined set of initiating events and
conditions. The initiating events causing the more serious
cascades and more consequential overloads and outages can be
identified. Moreover, since it is simulation based, mitigation 
measures can be identified to prevent and minimize the impact
of cascading outages. In this approach, analyzing and
mitigating a judicious selection of stressed cases is expected to
limit the general cascading risk. Moreover, the projected future
system can be analyzed.
On the other hand, the historical approach statistically
quantifies observed initiating line outages and their
propagation. There are no modeling assumptions, but the
analysis is limited to the quantities recorded and processed. In
effect all the system states, initiating events, and cascade
progressions are sampled over the time period of observation.
The blackout risk expressed as the distribution of the total
number of line outages can be estimated using a probabilistic
branching process model of the cascading. The lines of Idaho
power network historically vulnerable to cascading failures
can be identified. However, while the cascading risk is directly
assessed, in a historical approach it is impossible to test
potential mitigations, and difficult to assess the effect of
individual implemented mitigations.
Both approaches are capable to identify the top risk
outages that potentially could lead to cascading. Evaluating
results for eighteen common initiating events show that 3 
initial events (16%) in both approaches have been identified
by both approaches to be top risk cascading events.
Joint application of these two different approaches ensures
that advantages of each method can be used to help in better
understanding ofthe entire cascading process. By performing
a quick comparison of the results obtained by historical and
predictive approaches, one can immediately conclude that
there exists a correlation but also differences in modeling
assumptions and how initiating events, system configuration
changes, operational conditions, and maintenance
requirements are taken into account.
The selection of initiating events plays an important role in
the planning study since more complex initiating events are
likely to lead to cascading or local and widespread blackouts.
The planning study was based on a list of initiating events that
include two simultaneously outaged elements defined by
breaker-to-breaker operation. All five study cases show no
problems under any of the Ν-1 outages (this basically shows
that system was correctly designed to operate in safe operating
region for any of the N-1 outages.) Initiating events in the
planning study include lines or transformers or their
combination. The historical approach only considers automatic
line outages as initiating events. Often there was no cascading
beyond the initiating events, but 263 cascades had more than
one generation. Of these 263 cascades with more than one
generation, 222 began with a single outage, 29 began with a 
double outage, 9 began with a triple outage, and 3 began with
a quadruple outage. Presumably some of the 222 cascades
starting with a single automatic line outage cascaded further
also because of simultaneously occurring unusual patterns of
load, planned line outages, or outage of other equipment.
There is much less average propagation of line outages in
the simulated cascades used in the planning approach than in
the historical cascades. The simulated events overload many
lines, but fewer of these overloaded lines subsequently outage.
In this sense the planning approach focuses more on the
initiating events and the impacts of these initiating events
rather than the longer cascades occasionally observed in
practice in the historical data. There are interesting distinctions
involved in considering this difference. In particular, in a 
given situation, no further cascading can be both a more likely
and a plausible outcome, but further cascading remains
possible and does occasionally happen. That is, a simulation
that produces plausible and likely cascading sequences may
not sample some of the unlikely long cascades that
occasionally occur in practice, and are of concern due to their
high impact.
The statistical approach based on historical outage data has
a capability to estimate the overall blackout risk since it
includes all outage data with its actual frequency of occurrence.
If the branching process model parameters are found from
about one year of historical data, then the effect of the
cascading in producing the unlikely long cascades can be
predicted [8]. (The alternative of gathering historical data for
decades to directly estimate the rare events can be used, but
requires averaging the results over too long a period.)
The historical approach is much newer and less
systematically developed than the planning approach. Needed
elaborations to the historical approach include using inventory
additions to the system to correctly track the changes to the
system over time, considering the outages of transformers and
generators, and relating the outages to the recorded load
curtailments. The changes in topology should be monitored
using the sources of inventory data such as the list of new
additions with timing (planning) and SCADA data (operation).
In order to map future challenges, advantages and
disadvantages of both approaches are discussed. These two
methodologies are applied to an actual system, considering
data from the Idaho power system (cases in a period 2012-
2014 and historical outage data statistics collected in a period
1991-2015).
The statistical approach based on historical outage data can
be in some way used to validate and ensure the credibility of
planning studies. It is important to note that the statistical
approach does not replace the cascading planning studies
performed under the set of contingencies defined in NERC
TPL-001-4 standard [1].
As was pointed out in Section III, the main advantage of
historical data processing is that it doesn't require any
modeling assumptions and it has a very favorable grounding in
reality. Also, the statistical analysis of historical cascades
describes cascading risk averaged over a time period of
observation, during which the system changes. While the
statistical requirements for a long enough observation time can
be mitigated using branching process models, about a year of
data still seems to be needed for much of the analysis. Bulk
measures of propagation are also averaged over the entire
system.
While the main objectives of the comparison are to
benchmark the two methodologies and estimate the top risk
initiating events, additional results are obtained by both
methods.
The statistical approach provides a more general solution
to estimating an overall blackout risk than the standard
planning study approach, but historical approaches cannot
evaluate proposed mitigations. However, the planning study
approach may provide a practical way to prevent and mitigate
the cascading risk from specific sets of contingencies. The
planning approach may not be suitable to simulate the
uncertain variables such as random outages of generators and
transmission lines in power systems.
CONCLUSIONS
The study reported in this paper compares the historical
approach with a predictive approach for outages that lead to
cascading in the Idaho Power bulk electrical system. The
assessment of cascading outages is a task in planning and
operating a transmission system that goes beyond standard
requirements. The comprehensive historical and predictive
analysis of cascading outages provides a utility with a 
quantitative method to identify the outages with the highest
risks. The knowledge gained from this study helps company to
understand potential risks and to identify the potential
mitigation measures to prevent or minimize the impacts of
those outages. The approach presented here can be, in general,
helpful to utility industry in the process of monitoring risks of
cascading outages.
The results show advantages of performing both predictive
and historical evaluation of cascading outages. By performing
a quick comparison of past and predictive results, one can
immediately conclude that there are some conclusions in
common but also some basic differences in the framing of the
problem, modeling assumptions and how system configuration
changes, initiating events, cascade propagation, operational
conditions, and maintenance requirements are taken into
account. The two approaches broadly agree in determining the
parts of Idaho power network vulnerable to cascading failures.
The joint application ofthe two proposed approaches appears
useful for analyzing potential risks for cascading and for
identifying potential mitigation measures to prevent and
minimize the impact of cascading outages. Although we have
emphasized some of the differences in the approaches, future
work might combine parts of the approaches. For example,
one could try to apply the methods used to quantify the
historical cascading to simulated cascades that are suitably
sampled.
In this paper, basic issues and practical applications of the
two presented approaches have been presented. The aim ofthe
paper is not to develop new contributions to the cascading
theory but to highlight and contrast advantages and
disadvantages and practical constraints when the two methods
are applied to an actual system.
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